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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce signed on
September 15, 1993, by the Honorable Robert L. Newey, Judge of the
Second District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, and entered
of record on September 17, 1993.

Plaintiff's motion to set aside

the stipulation upon which the Decree was based was pending on
September 17, 1993, having been filed on July 30, 1993.

Said

motion was the subject of a hearing over two days in December,

1993.

The court entered its final order denying Plaintiffs Motion

to Set Aside Stipulation and Decree of Divorce on February 4, 1994.
There have been no prior appeals.
Jurisdiction is based on Title 78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah Code, and on
Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did

the

trial

court

abuse

its

discretion

in

approving, and subsequently refusing to set aside a stipulation
entered into by Wife while suffering from extreme anxiety and while
her reasoning was impaired by medication?
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing

to enter specific findings of fact justifying alimony, child
support and property awards?
3.

Did

the

trial

court

abuse

its

discretion

in

approving, and subsequently refusing to set aside inequitable
awards of alimony, child support and property?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
An award of alimony by the trial court will not be disturbed
so long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the
standards set by this state's appellate courts. Rudman v. Rudman,
812 P.2d 79 (Utah App. 1991); Haumont v.
(Utah App* 1990).

Haumont,

793 P.2d 423

The trial court's valuation and distribution of

marital property similarly will not be disturbed absent a showing
of a clear abuse of discretion. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 121 (Utah
App. 1990).
2

While the trial court enjoys broad discretion in matters of
divorce, such authority does not extend to an arbitrary and
unreasonable power to disregard credible, uncontradicted evidence
and make findings inconsistent therewith and issue an order based
thereon.

King v. King,

478 P.2d 492, 25 Utah 2d 163, 168 (1970).

The proceedings are in equity and the appellate court may review
questions of both law and fact, the very purpose of which is to
rectify errors where the evidence does not support the findings or
where it clearly preponderates against them, id.; Utah Const.,
VIII,

Sec.

9.

Art.

Due to the advantaged position of the trial court in

close proximity to the parties and the witnesses, in the practical
application of this rule there is a presumption of correctness of
the trial court's findings and judgment with the burden upon the
appellant to show they are in error and the appellate court must be
convinced that a manifest
Interest

of K.K.H.,

injustice has been done. State

in

Utah, 610 P.2d 849 (1980).

The trial court is also afforded broad discretion in ruling on
a motion for relief from judgment and its determination will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch
1114 (Utah App. 1989).

3

v. Birch,

111 P.2d

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Title

30-3-5 Utah Code, as amended.

See Exhibit A of

Title 78-45-3 Utah Code, as amended.

See Exhibit B of

addendum.

addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.
This

Nature of the Case.

is an

appeal

of the trial

court's

approval

of a

stipulation in a divorce case, and subsequent refusal to set aside
such stipulation, upon which the final Decree of Divorce was based.
The stipulation established alimony and child support and awarded
marital property between the parties.
2.

Course of the Proceedings.

Plaintiff/Appellant (Wife) filed for divorce.

The case was

scheduled for trial on April 28, 1993, and on that date the parties
appeared for trial, However, after conferring outside the presence
of the court, the parties presented an oral stipulation to the
court which was approved and apparently obviated the need for
trial.
Thereafter, confusion over terms of the stipulation resulted
in delay in submitting the final written Findings of Fact and
Decree of Divorce to the court.

In the meantime on July 30, 1993,

Plaintiff moved to set aside the stipulation and to be allowed to
proceed

to

trial

on

the

grounds

that

the

stipulation

was

unconscionable and that she had been under the influence of
4

medication on April 28 when the stipulation was approved.

The

court entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce on September 17, 1993, while Wife's motion to set aside
the stipulation was pending.

On December 20 and 28, 1993, the

court held an evidentiary hearing on Wife's motion to set aside the
stipulation and on February 4, 1994, the court entered its order
denying Wife's motion.
3.

Wife then filed this appeal.

Disposition in the District Court.

The court declined to set aside the stipulation and Decree of
Divorce, finding that Wife was able to understand the terms of the
stipulation

and that the terms of the stipulation were not

unconscionable.
4.

Statement of Relevant Facts.

Wife and Husband were married in December, 1975. Husband left
Wife in 1991 after Husband had engaged in multiple heterosexual and
homosexual affairs and Wife filed for divorce from Husband. (R.
132)

The breakup of the family plus fear of contracting AIDS and

other sexually transmissible diseases caused Wife to suffer severe
anxiety and depression.
Wife's Anxiety
Wife went

to

Dr. Samuel Wilson

on

September

complaining of what she thought was a strep throat.

3, 1991,
Dr. Wilson

found that she had a sore throat with white patches in her mouth
and heartburn.

The mouth and throat condition was severely

aggravated such that Doctor Wilson at first suspected that the

5

condition was probably cancer, although the condition ultimately
proved to be ulcers related to stress.

He suspected that the

heartburn was caused by peptic ulcer disease or gastroesophageal
reflex.

Dr. Wilson prescribed Axid and Carafate for her stomach.

(R. 477) He found Wife to be suffering from severe anxiety and on
September 27, 1991, he prescribed .5 milligrams of Xanax every
eight hours as needed to help her to function, sleep and minimize
her gastrointestinal problems.

(R. 478, 479, 487, 567)

On November 12, 1991, Dr. Wilson also prescribed 20 milligrams
of Prozac daily to treat Wife's severe depression. (R. 478, 479,
487)

The prescription was increased to 40 milligrams per day on

February 19, 1992. At this time Dr. Wilson also authorized Wife to
take up to eight .5 milligram doses of Xanax per day at times of
increased anxiety.

(R. 478, 479)

Kurt B. Thorn, a licensed clinical psychologist, first saw
Wife on August 27, 1991, and met regularly with Wife thereafter.1
(R. 509, 510)

He referred Wife to Dr. Wilson for prescription of

medication after finding Wife to be depressed and very anxious.
(R. 511, 512)
more

assertive

He sought through treatment to help Wife to become
in dealing

with

problems.

Regarding

Wife's

condition Dr. Thorn testified:

1

Dr. Thome also counseled Husband while the parties assessed
the future of their marriage. Dr. Thorne suspected that Husband
may have dissociative process. However, Husband dropped out of
therapy. (R. 516)
6

Q
What were the things that you observed that
lead you to believe that she was having trouble in
assertiveness?
A
Diane in her anxiety becomes pretty confused at
times and really indecisive and that's the symptom of the
depression that she was experiencing. And through that
indecisiveness she just was having a difficult time
making correct decisions.
She seemed to
- - She
perceived David as being way out of character from the
person that she had been married to.
And that was
alarming to her. She was mostly confused and anxious
about what to do in the circumstances she was under.
(R. 515)
Wife continued to take Xanax and Prozac through the date of
trial. Wife's anxiety increased as the trial date approached. Her
condition was aggravated by Husband's harassment which included
constant telephone calls at her place of work wherein he used
threats and vulgarities and entering the home without permission.
(R. 570, 514, 516)

Doctor Thorn testified that Wife's anxiety

increased as Husband concluded that he wanted a divorce, as
Husband's behavior deteriorated and as the trial date of April 28,
1993, approached.
Husband

(R. 513)

harassed

Wife

throughout

the

litigation

particularly during the two week period prior to trial.
514, 570, 571)

and

(R. 39,

On April 27, 1993, the day before trial, Wife,

Husband and counsel met for approximately six hours attempting to
settle the case.

The meeting was extremely stressful to Wife as

Husband acted out by throwing books on the table and threatening to

7

leave the state or go to jail rather than work and provide support
to his family. (R. 571)
Consumption of Xanax
Before the extremely high stress period preceding trial, Wife
had been taking about one Xanax per day.

She had not been taking

the medicine during the day because it made her sleepy. (R. 598)
Two weeks before the trial, Wife began taking two 5 milligram doses
of Xanax each day and gradually increased the amount to three doses
per day.

(R. 597)

On April 26, 1993, Wife took five 5 milligram

doses of Xanax. Wife took three 5 milligram doses of Xanax before
going to the settlement meeting on April 27, 1993. Before going to
bed the night of April 27 Wife took four 5 milligram doses of
Xanax.

Unable to sleep she took another 5 milligram dose at 1:30

a.m. (R. 598-604)

The following morning before trial she took

three 5 milligram doses of Xanax along with her regular dosage of
Prozac.2 (R. 573, 604)
Joyce Beckstrom, Wife's friend, testified that she had known
Wife since 1983, and that on the morning of the settlement meeting
on April 27, 1993, Wife had been very upset and had told Beckstrom
that she had taken Xanax.

(R. 656, 657)

That evening following

the conference Beckstrom saw Wife take Xanax between 6:00 and 8:00
p.m. (R. 651, 661)

Beckstrom testified that Wife was very upset

following the meeting and that Beckstrom gave another Xanax to Wife
2

Husband attacked Wife's testimony by introducing prescription
refill records to show that Wife would have already consumed all of
her Xanax before April 28, 1993. (R. 596-7)
8

following the meeting and that Beckstrom gave another Xanax to Wife
when Wife went to bed. Beckstrom stated, "I took the bottle to her
and handed her the bottle because she was so upset and she was very
upset and said she needed another one." (R. 660)
Wife testified that before the high stress period prior to
trial she did not regularly take the maximum amount of Xanax
allowed each day and that she "stockpiled" unused Xanax as she refilled prescriptions. (R. 597)
Effects of Xanax
Regarding the side effects of Xanax Dr. Wilson testified:
A
Again, the side effects of Xanax are many.
I guess the more severe is people that take Xanax will go
out completely, be asleep, not be able to function at
all. People have impaired thinking. May have increased
difficulty with making judgments, rational decisions.
May not be able to perform fine motor skills. May not be
able to do as well on tests and memory type functions.
But then again, if they have severe anxiety they may
perform better. (R. 481)

Q
. . . Is there an eyeball figure about how
much of a dosage it would take to make a person that
confused (to the point of not being able to remember
their street address)?
A
No. Some people do that on the lowest
recommended dose and other people will have that impact
even with what we consider toxic doses.
So its
individual. It's variable. (R. 482)
Dr. Wilson testified that if a substantial increase in the
dosage of Xanax occurs over a 24 or 48 hour period, individuals
"don't think well at all." (R. 488)

9

Stipulation
On April 28, 1993, the parties delayed the start of trial to
continue settlement discussions.

After approximately three and a

half hours and being encouraged by the court to hurry, the parties
advised the court that they had reached a stipulation.
582)

(R. 382,

After the attorneys stated the terms of the stipulation to

the court, the following exchange occurred:
MR. LAWRENCE: I think that covers all the
issues, Your Honor, unless there's something you'd like
to address:
THE COURT:
No, I think not. Let me
ask the Plaintiff, Diane Dautel, is this your
understanding? Do you understand the stipulation that
has been recited to the Court?
MRS. DAUTEL:

I think so.

THE COURT:
And is this your agreement?
Is this what you want the — your divorce decree to
incorporate by way of property settlement, alimony and
support?
MRS. DAUTEL:

I guess.

THE COURT:

Well

MRS. DAUTEL:

I'm a little iffy on it.

THE COURT:

Pardon me?

—

MRS. DAUTEL:
I'm questioning it a little
bit, but I guess I'll go along with it.
MR. LAWRENCE:
second your honor?
THE COURT:

Could I talk with her one
Yes.

(Of f-the-record discussion between Mr. Lawrence
and Mrs. Dautel.)

10

MR. LAWRENCE:
your Honor.

I think she's ready

THE COURT:
We would — we would
need you to state if that is your agreement,
if that's what you're agreeing to at this
time; otherwise, why the Court would proceed
with the trial of the case.
MRS. DAUTEL:

Yes, I'll agree with that.

THE COURT:
And that's —
what you want to do at this time?
MRS. DAUTEL:
...
At

that's

Yes.

(R. 124-126)

this point,

counsel

for Husband

interjected

several

additional items regarding the parties' stipulation, including a
waiver of Husband's claim of a premarital contribution to the home
and Wife's waiver of accrued and unpaid temporary alimony. (R. 126129) Then the following occurred:
THE COURT:
Very well. Now, with these
clarifications, let me again ask each party if this is
your agreement and if this is the agreement you want the
divorce decree entered on and incorporated into the
decree.
You both understand what counsel has said by way of
clarification, and this is your agreement.
Is that
correct, Mrs. Dautel?
MRS. DAUTEL:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Mr. Dautel?

MR. DAUTEL:

Yes, it is, Your Honor.

THE COURT:
All right.
The Court
believes that through great effort on the part of counsel
and the parties - - that's the reason I permitted you
extra time rather than starting this morning — that you
have been able to devise an agreement that appears to the
Court to be fair and reasonable under all the
11

circumstances. And I would approve your agreement and
permit you to incorporate it into the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree of divorce which the Court
would sign.
...

(R. 129, 130)

The court at no time asked Wife if she were taking any
medication.

Disputes concerning terms of the oral stipulation

arose when the Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce were prepared
and these documents were not signed by the court until nearly five
months after the date of the stipulation. (R. 136) In the meantime,
Wife concluded that her attorney had not protected her rights,
obtained new counsel and filed a Motion to Set Aside Stipulation.
(R. 137, 142)
Terms of Stipulation
At the time of trial, the parties had been married over 17
years and had four children, custody of which was awarded to Wife.
(R. 216, 217)

Wife had worked only part-time within the home and

made a few hundred dollars per month doing manicures.
earned at least $4,129 per month.

Defendant

(R. 218)

The stipulation provided that Husband would pay $944.00 per
month as child support after imputing a wage of $800 to Wife,
despite Wife's lesser actual earnings of under $600 per month made
as a part-time manicurist at home (R. 51, 218, 580). Husband had
been ordered to pay temporary child support of $990 per month in
the temporary order, with no imputation of additional income to
Wife being made.

(R. 51)

12

Despite the long duration of the marriage and the great
disparity in earnings, the stipulation provided that the Wife would
receive only $100 per month as alimony for six months until certain
stock would be sold and that she would thereafter receive permanent
alimony in the amount of $300 per month.

(R. 219, 220) Previously,

Husband had been ordered to pay $400 as temporary alimony (R. 52) .
The stipulation provided that Wife would receive the home
subject to Husband's lien for one-half of the appraised equity
which would be payable to Husband upon Wife's remarriage or
cohabitation with another man.

Wife was to assume responsibility

for first and second mortgages on the home and to pay taxes
thereon.

(R. 220) Husband had depleted the savings account in

which the parties' tax reserve was maintained leaving Wife to pay
all taxes on the home for the year 1992.

(R. 580, 581)

The present division of personal property between the parties
was confirmed.

(R. 220)

Wife was required to pay to Husband

$7,000.00 adjusted for taxes upon receipt of one-half of certain
shares of stock.
temporary

(R. 221)

alimony.

Husband7s 401K plan.

Wife also waived $2,745 in delinquent

(R. 219, 579)
(R. 222)

Wife waived any claim to

Wife was required to pay her own

attorney's fees, where Husband had been ordered to assist in the
payment of attorney/s fees in the temporary order.

(R. 223, 53)

Hearing to Set Aside Stipulation
At the hearing to set aside the stipulation, Wife testified
that she did not understand, in light of temporary alimony having

13

been set at $400 per month, why alimony was reduced to $100 per
month to be increased to $300 per month after the stock had been
sold.

She stated that there was no reason for alimony to be $100

per month until the stock was sold as Husband's portion of debts
had already been substantially paid off by April 28, 1993.

(R.

455, 460, 462, 463)
Wife testified that she did not understand why she had to
surrender the $2,745 in back alimony and pay $7,000 to her husband
from her portion of the stock where the division of personal
property and allocation of indebtedness did not leave her $7,000
ahead, but $5,000 behind.3

(R. 575, 443, 455, 460-463)

She did

not agree that Husband should be allowed to keep all of the vested
401K retirement plan (R. 450)
D. Michael Nielsen, a domestic law attorney who had practiced
11 years before the Second District commissioners and judges,
testified that the award of alimony was wholly deficient based upon
his experience. He testified that an appropriate range of alimony
given the great disparities in earnings would be between $500 and
$1,100 per month in order to more closely equalize the incomes of
the parties and there was no basis given in the stipulation for
Wife's conceding such a benefit.

(R. 615, 617, 628-631, 635, 648,

650, 651)

3

Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 5 reveal a chasm of difference in
the valuation of the parties' personal property distribution, with
Husband's valuation having Wife $14,000 ahead in value and
Wife's valuation having Husband ahead $5,000 in value.
14

Mr. Nielsen testified that the settlement was troublesome
because the findings of fact and decree failed to identify the
rationale for alimony and property and debt distribution, and,
accordingly, he could find no basis for Wife to have conceded the
$2,745 unpaid temporary alimony and to have agreed to make the
$7,000 payment to Husband.

(R. 620, 626, 631)

He could not see

why the 4OIK plan had not been equally divided. (R. 623)

He

testified that given the great earnings disparities, Wife should
have been entitled to an award of attorney's fees. (R. 632, 633)
He was concerned that Wife's discovery to Husband regarding assets
had not been answered (R. 622, 623).
Mr. Nielsen conceded that he had not been party to settlement
negotiations but testified:
A.
There — there should not ever be a case where
you can't look at the findings and determine what the
give and take was. And this is my point about this case.
It's not possible in this case. The give and take, the
consideration.
What she gave up to take such a low
amount certainly is not evident from any evidence. Any
of the assets—anything about this case. (R. 648)
Ruling
Despite the evidence, the court found that Wife did not appear
to be impaired at trial on April 28, 1993, that the settlement was
fair and that the court would have made substantially the same
award of alimony and of assets had it heard the case on the merits
at trial.

(R. 728, 735, 736)

The court thereupon denied Wife's

Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation.

15

(R. 378-386)

However, the

court made no specific findings regarding why the awards of
alimony, child support and property were fair and appropriate.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN APPROVING, AND
SUBSEQUENTLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION SINCE
WIFE WAS SUFFERING FROM EXTREME ANXIETY AND WAS UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF MEDICATION
Wife's confusion when she entered into the stipulation at
trial was evident.

Wife's response to the first four questions

were: "I think so.", "I guess.", "I'm a little iffy on it." and
"I'm questioning it a little bit, but I guess I'll go along with
it." This confusion should have alerted the court that Wife was in
no condition to enter into a stipulation.

Even if, arguendo,

the

court lacked complete information of Wife's mental condition at the
time of the hearing on April 28, 1993, it did have such information
after the hearing to set aside the stipulation.

The court abused

its discretion in refusing to accept such information and set aside
the stipulation.
Property settlements are not binding upon trial courts in
divorce proceedings and trial courts have the right and duty to
void unconscionable stipulations. Nunley
475 (Utah App. 1988); Clausen
1983); Naylor

v. Naylor,

v. Clausen,

v. Nunley,

757 P.2d 473,

675 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah

563 P.2d 184# 185 (Utah 1977).

A stipulation is a form of contract and basic to a valid
stipulation is the meeting of the minds of those involved.

16

Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987). A person lacks
capacity to enter into a contract when he is unable to understand
the nature and consequences of the transaction.
Contracts,

Second,

Section

15

(1)(a).4

Restatement

Because

of

in-court

stipulations have not been reduced to writing and are exceptions to
the Statute of Frauds, it is incumbent upon the trial court to
assure that a valid mutual consent has in fact occurred.
335.

Id.

at

Here the court failed to assure that Wife was capable of

knowingly and intelligently giving her consent to the stipulation.
The evidence was uncontradicted that Wife suffered from severe
anxiety and related confusion which was aggravated by Husband's
change of sexual orientation and harassing behavior during the
breakup of the marriage. The severity of Wife's anxiety condition
was clearly manifested, not only in her behavior and personality,
but also in her physical illness of mouth and throat ulcers so
severe they were suspected of being cancer.

(R. 477)

Husband's harassing and coercive behavior immediately prior to
trial aggravated Wife's condition, resulting in Wife taking a much
higher dosage of Xanax over a 24 hour period immediately prior to
trial than she was used to taking.

4

It has long been recognized that impaired reasoning due to
alcohol consumption can prevent a meeting of the minds. A party
may show, in order to defeat a settlement by him, that, at the time
he was incapable of contracting intelligently by reason of
intoxication, and evidence of the party's condition before or after
the settlement is relevant to show the party's condition at the
time the settlement was made. Phelan v. Gardner, 43 Cal. 306 (Cal.
1872) .
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Expert testimony established that even small doses of Xanax
can cause fatigue and confusion and that a sudden increase in
consumption can dramatically impair thinking; thus# explaining
Wife/s confused responses when asked to approve the stipulation.5
Despite Wife's evident confusion, following the hearing to set
aside the stipulation, the trial court erroneously entered findings
that Wife's responses to the court were clear and concise at the
time the stipulation was approved, that Wife appeared to be alert
and fully understand the stipulation and that Wife appeared to act
and respond normally and accurately to the court's questions.

(R.

382, Findings 1 and 3)
In upholding the stipulation, the trial court also entered
findings

which

were

conflicting

and

in

disregard

of

expert

testimony regarding the effects of consumption of Xanax. The court
found that Wife had failed by a preponderance of the evidence to
prove that she had taken the amount of Xanax claimed even though
there was no direct evidence to the contrary, even though Joyce
Beckstrom testified that she observed Wife take Xanax, and even
though Joyce Beckstrom testified that she personally gave Wife
Xanax the night before trial. (R.651-661) It declined to find that
Wife had not stockpiled drugs (R. 735), and yet found that Wife's
supply of Xanax was fully depleted by April 28, 1993. (R. 384,

5

The stipulation was approved by Wife only after additional
off-the-record consultation with counsel who told her, MJust go
along with this. It's for the best of everybody concerned." (R.
440)
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Finding 8) .

While rejecting Wife's testimony regarding the number

of Xanax she had taken, the court found that Wife was allowed to
take up to 8 four milligram pills per day of Xanax (R. 384, Finding
8) and, therefore, implicitly Wife should have not been impaired
even if she had taken as much Xanax as claimed.

However, in so

finding the court failed to consider the expert testimony that an
increase in the amount of Xanax consumed would affect reasoning
ability. (R. 488)
This Court has the power in equity to substitute its own
judgment where the trial court's assessment of the facts results in
a manifest injustice.

In re K.K.H.,

supra.

This case does not

merely involve the normal stress which accompanies any divorce
trial.

Wife was subjected to months of extreme psychological and

physical

stress

related

to

her

husband's

change

of

sexual

preference, her fear of contracting AIDS, the ensuing marital
breakup and Husbands' coercive behavior immediately prior to trial.
Her increased use of Xanax and its effect on her was logical and
entitled to the serious consideration of the trial court.

This

Court must remedy this lapse of equity by setting aside the
stipulation and allowing Wife to proceed to trial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ENTER
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT JUSTIFYING ALIMONY, CHILD
SUPPORT AND PROPERTY AWARDS
Neither the findings of fact following trial, nor the findings
of fact following the hearing to set aside the stipulation revealed
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the logic which resulted in the alimony, child support and property
awards.

Presumed factors behind the stipulation were addressed

during the hearing to set aside the stipulation, but the court
never specifically addressed any of the factors in reaching its
general conclusion that it would have made the same awards if the
case had been tried.
In Lee v. Lee,

744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah App. 1987) the Court

stated:
In divorce proceedings, the trial court has
considerable discretion in adjusting the financial and
property interests of the parties. Argryle v. Argyle, 688
P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984). The "determination of the
value of the assets is a matter for the trial court which
will not be reviewed in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion."
Turner v. Turner,
649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah
1982)(citations omitted). However, the trial court must
make findings on all material issues, and its failure to
do so constitutes reversible error unless the facts in
the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment."
Acton v. Deliran,
737 P.2d 996,999 (Utah 1987). The
findings must be sufficiently detailed and consist of
enough subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court
took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue
presented. Id.
As Michael Nielsen testified:
A.
There . . . should not ever be a case
where you can't look at the findings and determine what
the give and take was. And this is my point about this
case. It's not possible in this case. The give and
take, the consideration. What she gave up to take such
a low amount certainly is not evident from any evidence.
Any of the assets—anything in this case.
(R. 648)
Therefore, the court abused its discretion in failing to enter
specific findings justifying the terms of the settlement.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN APPROVING, AND
SUBSEQUENTLY REFUSING TO SET ASIDE, INEQUITABLE AWARDS OF
ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT AND PROPERTY.
After the stipulation Wife received less alimony and less
child support than she had been receiving under the Courts
temporary order. After the stipulation Wife had surrendered $2,745
in unpaid temporary alimony and agreed to pay Husband $7,000.
After the stipulation, Husband had merely waived claims which had
already been judged to be without merit. The final settlement was
unconscionable such that this Court must act in equity to correct
a manifest injustice. State

in Interest

of KKH, supra.

Alimony
The purpose and factors involved in alimony are stated in
Jones

v. Jones,

700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985):

This Court has described the purpose of alimony:
"The most important function of alimony is to provide
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and to
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge."
English
v. English,
565 P.2d at 411. With this purpose in
mind, the court in English articulated three factors that must
be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award:
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the
wife;
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to provide
support.
The award of alimony to Wife was manifestly unjust given her
needs and the great disparity of earning power between the parties.
At the time of trial the parties had been married over 17 years and
21

had four children, custody of which was awarded to Wife. Wife had
worked only part-time within the home and made a few hundred
dollars per month doing manicures.

Defendant earned at least

$4,129 per month. (R. 216, 217, 218)
Although Husband had been ordered to pay temporary alimony of
$400 per month (R. 52), the stipulation provided Wife would only
receive alimony of $100 per month for the first six months, and
$300 per month thereafter.
January

11,

1993,

claimed

Husband's financial declaration dated
total

monthly

expenses

of

$3,123

including child support at the temporary order rate of $990 per
month and alimony in the temporary amount of $400 per month.
96)

His financial declaration

filed on September

(R.

14, 1992,

revealed total living expenses of $2,963. (R. 81) Wife's financial
declaration dated September 21, 1992, showed a need of $2,986 with
an average gross monthly income from her manicure business of
$351.00.

(R. 74, 76) The temporary order was based upon an income

to Wife of $600 per month.

(R. 580)

There clearly was ample

ability for Defendant to pay greater alimony than ordered as a
result of the stipulation.
Defendant contended that the reduction

in the amount of

alimony was bargained for in exchange for agreeing that alimony
would be permanent. (R. 444, 579 )

However, the commissioner at

the September 22, 1992, Pretrial Conference had already recommended
that permanent alimony be awarded in a (then) 17 year marriage

(R.

72), making this concession on the part of Husband of no value.
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Mr. Nielsen testified that a reasonable alimony award under
the circumstances would have been a permanent award in the range of
$550 to $1,100 per month in order to equalize the positions of the
parties.

Such an award clearly is called for when the financial

condition and needs of Wife, Wife's ability to produce income and
ability of Husband to support Wife are considered. Jones v.
supra.

Jones,

Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in finding

that the award of alimony was reasonable, particularly where the
trial court offered

no specific

findings as to why

it was

reasonable under the circumstances.
Child Support
Wife was awarded temporary child support in the amount of $990
per month based upon an imputed wage of $557 for Wife and Husband's
salary of $3,960. (R. 51, 57) Although Wife had not experienced an
increase in earnings, the stipulation imputed earnings to her of
$800 per month and showed Husband's earnings at $4,129 per month,
resulting in a lesser award of child support of $944. (R. 218)
Again, the trial court abused its discretion in not examining this
situation and making an appropriate award supported by accurate
findings.
Property Distribution
A wife is entitled to a fair and equitable share of the
financial benefits accumulated by virtue of the parties' joint
efforts during the marriage.

Lee,

23

supra.

Wife conceded a $7,000 payment to Husband to "equalize" the
personal property division6, although her valuation of the personal
property distribution put Husband ahead $5,000.
Exhibits 1 and 5)

(Plaintiff's

Plaintiff waived her liquidated claim of back

temporary alimony of $2,745, while Husband conceded a spurious
claim

of approximately

$2,000

for non-marital

funds used to

purchase the home 17 years earlier which had been specifically
rejected by the commissioner's pretrial recommendation.7

(R. 641)

Wife received no attorney's fees although she had received
such an award at the temporary hearing.

She was left holding the

entire property tax debt on the home when she found that Husband
had raided the account which had always been used to provide the
tax reserve.

(R. 580)

Although Husband's pretrial offer of

settlement provided that Wife should receive one-half of the vested
401K plan (R. 66) # the stipulation resulted in Wife waiving any
right thereto. (R. 222)
The stipulation resulted in Wife receiving less alimony and
child support than she had received under the temporary order with
no compensating

increase in property settlement, and, to the

contrary, a property settlement of less than half of the marital

^he $7,000 payment was subject to reduction to the amount
Wife was taxed on the shares but this resulted in no net cash
benefit to Wife. (R.221, 222)
7

The commissioner's minute entry states, "Defendant would like
credit for $2000 of premarital funds invested in the home. The
court would find that after this long, the funds are co-mingled."
(R. 72, 588)
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assets.

Accordingly, the stipulation must be set aside in order

to remedy a manifest injustice.

CONCLUSION
This

Court

must

find

that

the

trial

discretion and set aside the stipulation.

court

abused

its

It must order the trial

court to conduct a trial on all issues and enter an appropriate
decree supported by specific findings of fact.

The trial court

should be instructed that the stipulation was not fair and given
guidelines to assure that Wife receives sufficient awards of
alimony and child support and a fair property settlement, including
an order requiring that increased support awards be retroactive to
the date of the stipulation.
Wife should be awarded her reasonable costs and attorney's
fees incurred in conducting this appeal and such other relief as
may be appropriate.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

£ 7

day of June, 1994.

NEIL B. CRIST
PAUL W. MORTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A:

Title 30-3-5 Utah Code, as amended

EXHIBIT B:

Title 78-4-3 Utah Code, as amended

30-3-5- Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Division of debts
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meritorious petition for modification [Effective until
January 1, 1994].
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children; and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
-^r training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
-»ew orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
•hildren and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the disribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necesary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
aembers of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of
he child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
he court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termiates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
s annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his
rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order
by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.

EXHIBIT A

78-45-3. Duty of man.
Every father shall support his child; and everyman shall support hxs wrfe
when she is in need.
T , « « J . 110 8 3:1977, ch.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, 5 3, u m , « .
140, 5 3; 1991, d t l f t « 1^ .
Amendment Note*. - The » » ? ™ ™
ment, effective April 29,1991. « * J « ? » J *
ther" for "man" and "every man" to "he.

CrowBrferencM. - Criminal nonwipport
cfaiUMn ^ § 7(J . 7 _ 201
j ^ ^ ^ t e n a n c e of parties, i 3<W-5.
U n i & rm Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
AA I7M1-1 et «q.
Act, s u-o* « - 4

EXHIBIT B

